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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S SALT CONSULTATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT
ON SALT FOR GOJ OFFICIALS. REQUEST EMBASSY TYPE TEXT,
DOUBLE SPACE, IN FORM SUITABLE FOR READING BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSMISSION TO GOJ.

2. BEGIN TEXT. IT IS INDEED A PLEASURE FOR ME TO RETURN
TO JAPAN ONCE AGAIN, THIS TIME TO CONSULT ON THE CURRENT
STATUS OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. AS YOU KNOW,
THE UNITED STATES IS CONVINCED OF THE IMPORTANCE AND
UTILITY OF DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES ON SALT
DEVELOPMENTS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REGULARLY CONSULTED WITH
YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND I KNOW YOU HAVE
THEIR REPORTS, I AM GLAD TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET

WITH YOU DIRECTLY AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON SALT MATTERS OF
MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. I HAVE PREPARED THESE REMARKS IN THE INTEREST OF
SUCCINCTNESS AND COMPLETENESS, BUT I HOPE THIS WILL NOT

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DISCOURAGE YOUR PRESENTING YOUR IDEAS OR INTERRUPTING TO ASK QUESTION. I REALIZE SOME OF YOU MAY NOT BE FAMILIAR WITH ALL OF THE SPECIALIZED TERMS AND CONCEPTS THAT HAVE

GROWN AROUND THE LONG AND COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS COMPLICATED FIELD OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THEREFORE, I HOPE YOU WILL FEEL ENTIRELY FREE TO ASK QUESTIONS ON ANYTHING YOU MAY NOT ENTIRELY UNDERSTAND, FOR IT IS TO ANSWER SUCH QUESTIONS THAT IS ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF MY VISIT. FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATION, I WOULD WELCOME A FULL AND FREE DISCUSSION, FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE OF MY VISIT IS TO SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR ON BEHALF OF YOUR ORGANIZATIONS.

4. FIRST I WILL BRIEFLY REVIEW THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER 1974 UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV.

5. THROUGHOUT THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE PROCEEDED SINCE NOVEMBER 1972, WE HAVE SOUGHT MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIMITATIONS THAN WERE ACHIEVED IN 1972 WHICH WOULD BE BOTH STABILIZING AND EQUITABLE FOR THE LONGER TERM. AS YOU KNOW, THE ABM TREATY OF 1972, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, LIMITED ABM DEPLOYMENTS TO A NOMINAL LEVEL, THUS REMOVING A MAJOR SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF 1972, WHICH IS OF FIVE YEARS DURATION UNLESS EARLIER REPLACED, FROZE THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AT LEVELS WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE TO US FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. IN SALT TWO WE HAVE SOUGHT NOT ONLY LONGER TERM CONSTRAINTS ON ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS BUT ALSO INCLUSION OF HEAVY BOMBERS IN AN EQUAL OVERALL NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON THESE THREE "CENTRAL" SYSTEMS. WE CONSIDER ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO BE "CENTRAL" STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BECAUSE THEY ARE CENTRAL TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE ALSO SOUGHT LIMITS ON MIRVED LAUNCHERS IN ORDER TO CONSTRAIN THIS NEW CHANNEL FOR COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS. WE HAVE SOUGHT A FIRM BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY. AND WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY RESISTED ANY COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW

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US NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHICH ARE FORWARD-DEPLOYED TO SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS AND MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS ABROAD.

6. PRIOR TO THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, THE SOVIETS RESISTED THE CONCEPT THAT THE AGGREGATE LIMIT ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES. THEY CALLED FOR US WITHDRAWAL OF OUR SO-CALLED "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS", AND SOUGHT COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES AND SUPPORTED DISADVANTAGES IN THE SOVIET GEOGRAPHIC POSITION.

8. HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AGREED ON THE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A NEW AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEY AGREED THAT:

-- EACH SIDE WILL BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL NUMBER--2400--OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS, I.E., ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. IF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (ASMS) OF RANGES OVER 600 KM ARE DEPLOYED IN THE FUTURE, THEY WILL ALSO BE COUNTED AGAINST THE TOTAL. THE US INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION IS THAT ONLY BALLISTIC ASMS ON BOMBERS ARE COVERED AND CRUISE MISSILES ARE NOT. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM-TO-MIX EXCEPT THAT NO NEW FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS CAN BE CONSTRUCTED OR ANY ADDITIONAL HEAVY ICBMS DEPLOYED.

-- IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT EACH SIDE WILL ALSO BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBER--1300--OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH MIRVs, AGAIN WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM-TO-MIX. I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT IN BOTH INSTANCES--THAT IS, IN THE AGGREGATE LEVEL AND THE MIRV LEVEL--THE AGREED FIGURES ARE BENEATH OUR BEST REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF FUTURE SOVIET FORCE LEVELS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT AND FAR BELOW OUR ESTIMATE OF THEIR MAXIMUM CAPABILITIES.

-- NO COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIET UNION WAS AGREED FOR "FRS" OR FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES. IN SHORT, SUCH SYSTEMS WERE NOT TO BE LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT; AND

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LASTLY,

-- THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS TO CONTINUE IN FORCE UNTIL ITS EXPIRATION IN OCTOBER 1977. ITS RELEVANT PROVISIONS, AS WELL AS ITS KEY INTERPRETATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, ARE TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH WILL COVER THE PERIOD THROUGH 1985. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WILL BE A PROVISION FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

8. IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, OUR EFFORTS IN GENEVA HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THAT UNDERSTANDING AND PREPARING THE TEXT OF A NEW AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ON FEBRUARY 1, 1975 THE SOVIET UNION TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE US TABLED A DRAFT OF ITS OWN ON MARCH 5. THE TWO DRAFTS CONTAINED AREAS OF AGREEMENT BUT ALSO REFLECTED DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAINED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WITH RESPECT TO SOME MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN ORDER TO EXPLORE

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FURTHER THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, MINISTER SEMENOV AND I AGREED TO ESTABLISH WORKING GROUPS ON DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED, AND ON VERIFICATION ISSUES, AS WELL AS A DRAFTING GROUP TO HANDLE THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF DRAFTING THE NEW AGREEMENT. ON MAY 7 THE DRAFTING GROUP COMPLETED A JOINT DRAFT TEXT (JDT) FOR SUBMISSION AS REFERENDUM TO THE CHIEFS OF DELEGATION AND THEN TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. AREAS OF AGREEMENT WERE EXPRESSED IN COMMON LANGUAGE, AND REMAINING DIFFERENCES WERE DENOTED WITH BRACKETS. THIS DOCUMENT HAS SINCE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING THE NEW AGREEMENT IN GENEVA.

9. I NOW WANT TO OUTLINE THE MAJOR AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AS THEY HAVE EVOLVED FROM VLADIVOSTOK TO THE PRESENT. AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THE SOVIET SIDE MAINTAINS THAT ITS PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. THEIR DRAFT IN FACT CALLS FOR THE AGREED AGGREGATE AND MIRV LEVELS, CARRIES OVER CERTAIN RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND CONTAINS SEVERAL AND II AND PERTINENT PROCEDURAL ARTICLES ON VERIFICATION,

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THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND WITHDRAWAL) AND PROVIDES FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, MANY OF THEIR PROPOSALS IN OUR VIEW GO BEYOND THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING.

10. AS I HAVE NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS THAT BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE ASMS OVER 600 KM RANGE ARE COVERED BY VLADIVOSTOK, WHEREAS THE US VIEW IS THAT ONLY BALLISTIC ASMS CARRIED ON BOMBERS ARE INCLUDED. IN ADDITION, WHEN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED AFTER THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING THE USSR PROPOSED TO BAN ALL SUCH ASMS ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN "BOMBERS". MORE RECENTLY, THEY HAVE PROPOSED TO EXTEND THIS BAN TO COVER ALL AIRCRAFT EXCEPT "HEAVY BOMBERS". FURTHER, THE SOVIETS PROPOSE TO BAN MIRVED ASMS. WHILE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD, INTER ALIA, BAN AIR-MOBILE ICBMS ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED LAND-MOBILE ICBMS. THESE TWO MATTERS ARE OF COURSE RELATED BUT HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

11. THE SOVIETS INITIALLY OBJECTED TO INCLUDING IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED. HOWEVER, THEY LATER AGREED TO THIS PRINCIPLE. IN THE CURRENT SESSION THERE HAS BEEN A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED, LEADING TO AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF

A DEFINITION OF AN ICBM, AN SLBM, AND A MIRV SYSTEM. THERE IS ALSO AGREEMENT THAT HEAVY BOMBERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE BASIC AGGREGATE BE SPECIFIED BY NAME AND THAT FUTURE BOMBERS SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THEIR INCLUSION IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE STRONGLY RESISTED OUR CONTENTION THAT THE BACKFIRE IS A HEAVY BOMBER AND SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE.

12. THE TWO SIDES ALSO CONTINUE TO DIFFER OVER THE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM, WHICH THE US PROPOSES BE ANY ICBM WITH A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SS-19. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO RESIST CONSIDERATION OF THROW-WEIGHT AS AN ELEMENT IN ANY SUCH DEFINITION, THEY NOW SEEM SOMEWHAT LESS RESISTANT TO THE

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PRINCIPLE THAT THERE BE A DEFINITION OF A HEAVY MISSILE. PREVIOUSLY, THEY WERE UNWILLING TO CONSIDER ANYTHING BEYOND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVISION ON THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBMS TO LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS, ALONG WITH THE RELATED LIMITATION ON INCREASES IN LAUNCHER SIZE.

13. THE SOVIETS PREVIOUSLY HAD PROPOSED TO BAN IN THE NEW AGREEMENT A NUMBER OF SYSTEMS NOT CURRENTLY IN BEING. IN THE CURRENT SESSION, BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW AGREED TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS: LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE; BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KM ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES; AND INSTALLATIONS FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED, INCLUDING THE BEDS OF TERRITORIAL SEAS, THE OCEAN FLOOR, OF THE BEDS OF INTERNAL WATERS. IN THE CASE OF THESE SO-CALLED "SEA-BED" SYSTEMS, BOTH FIXED LAUNCHERS AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS THAT MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM WOULD BE BANNED. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BAN ALL CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, NOT JUST THOSE WHICH ARE LAND-BASED, AS WELL AS CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KM ON SUBMARINES. (NEITHER SIDE HAS PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS ON LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES OF LESS THAN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.) THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED TO INCLUDE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT A BAN ON SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO EARTH ORBIT, AS WELL AS TO BAN FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEMS. SUCH A PROVISION WILL GO BEYOND THE PROHIBITION ON ACTUALLY PLACING SUCH WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE THAT IS CONTAINED IN THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY.

SINCE IT WILL BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS FOR PLACING THESE WEAPONS INTO EARTH ORBIT. THE TWO SIDES ARE PRESENTLY SEEKING MUTUALLY AGREEABLE LANGUAGE FOR IMPLEMENTING THESE BANS.

14. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE CONCEPT CARRIED OVER FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE BAN AND THAT THEIR NUMBER SHOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY

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INCREASED. THE U.S. IS ALSO INSISTING UPON CARRYING OVER FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SILENT REGARDING THE LATTER QUESTION. BOTH SIDES HAVE ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROHIBIT LOCATING EXTRA MISSILES IN ICBM LAUNCHER AREAS TOGETHER WITH EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD GIVE A CAPABILITY OF RAPID RELOADING OF FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

15. IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS AT GENEVA I HAVE RAISED SEVERAL PROBLEMS REGARDING VERIFICATION OF THE MIRV PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND I HAVE SUGGESTED WAYS IN WHICH THESE PROBLEMS COULD BE DEALT WITH. FOR EXAMPLE, I INDICATED THAT IF A CERTAIN TYPE OF MISSILE HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED WITH BOTH SINGLE WARHEADS AND MIRVS, ANY MISSILE OF THAT TYPE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WHEN DEPLOYED. THE ISSUE OF MIRV VERIFICATION CONTINUES TO BE UNRESOLVED, ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED AT SENIOR LEVELS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

16. A RELATED ISSUE IS THE ASSURANCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO VERIFY ALL RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. WHILE BOTH SIDES ARE AGREED THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THAT SUCH MEANS MUST NOT BE INTERFERED WITH, THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED LANGUAGE PROVIDING THAT THE PARTIES WILL NOT USE ANY MEASURE OR PRACTICE WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDES VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE SOVIETS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BANNING "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES" ARE SUFFICIENT. THE DISAGREEMENT IN THIS AREA CENTERS AROUND OUR INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE A SPECIFIC SPELLING OUT OF WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES".

17. IN RESPONSE TO INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS THAT I HAVE MADE TO HIM, MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THAT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT

WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT COULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION

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RATHER THAN AWAIT THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS REPRESENTS SOME MOVEMENT FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION THAT THE AGREEMENT MERELY COVER THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 3, 1977 THROUGH 1985. WE HAVE AGREED THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ON WHICH OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THIS PRINCIPLE.

18. FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA TOOK THE POSITION THAT, FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND "POSSIBLE" REDUCTIONS WOULD BEGIN "NO LATER THAN 1980-1981". THE U.S. HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. WE PROPOSE A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO BEGIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AT AN EARLY DATE AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, BUT NOT LATER THAN IN 1977. THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THE U.S. PROPOSAL ALSO STATES AS AN OBJECTIVE OF THE SIDES THE CONCLUSION WELL IN ADVANCE OF 1985 OF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL EXPIRE IN 1985. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY MOVED FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION TO A POSITION THAT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN AT ANY TIME IN 1977.

19. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE RECENTLY SAID THAT THEY INTEND TO RAISE "FBS" AND THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES AT THESE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE MATTERS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE FEBRUARY 1, 1975 SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT THE SIDES SHOULD "IN THE NEAR FUTURE" CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF REDUCING "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS", AS WELL AS QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. RECENTLY, WHILE CONTINUING TO STRESS THEIR CONCERN OVER THESE ISSUES, THE SOVIETS HAVE CHANGED THEIR APPROACH. THEY WITHDREW FROM THE DRAFT TEXT THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN THEIR FEBRUARY 1, 1975 DRAFT WHICH PROPOSED WHAT THEY CALL A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION.

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THIS PROVISION CALLS ON THE PARTIES NOT TO UNDERTAKE
ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE
AGREEMENT'S PROVISIONS "THROUGH A THIRD STATE" OR "IN ANY
OTHER MANNER". THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT SUCH A
PROVISION BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UNILATERAL U.S. STATEMENT

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THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BUILD UP FRS AND WILL ALSO UNDERTAKE
TO REDUCE SUCH SYSTEMS. AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED,
THE SOVIETS SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT THEY INTEND TO RAISE
FRS AND THE "EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD
COUNTRIES" AT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND
REDUCTIONS. I HAVE REPLIED, "MOST RECENTLY IN MY
STATEMENT TO THE SOVIETS ON SEPTEMBER 11, THAT THE TOPICS
OF "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS", AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD
COUNTRIES ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, NOR WILL THE U.S. AGREE TO THEIR
INCLUSION IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS.

20. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO PROPOSED A PROVISION ON
NON TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH INCLUDES
A PROHIBITION ON THE TRANSFER OF COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTIONS AND BLUEPRINTS. I HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED
TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT UNTIL THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE
AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN DECIDED AND IT IS CLEAR AS TO EXACTLY
WHAT SYSTEMS ARE TO BE LIMITED. IN ADDITION, OUR POSITION
REMAINS THAT THE ATA TREATY DOES NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR
WHATEVER PROVISION MAY BE CONSIDERED IN AN AGREEMENT
LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

21. THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION. I WILL BE
GLAD TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. END TEXT

KISSINGER

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